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The Apparent Consistency of Religion Clause 
Doctrine 
Abner S. Greene* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A hallmark of religion clause scholarship is the complaint that the 
doctrine is a hopeless muddle. However, the Rehnquist Court brought 
a considerable amount of consistency—well, apparent consistency—
to the doctrine. I say “apparent consistency” because, just as a 
paradox is only a seeming contradiction, so was the Rehnquist 
Court’s religion clause jurisprudence only seemingly consistent. The 
doctrine focuses on whether the government singles out religion for 
special benefit (generally problematic under the Establishment 
Clause) or for special burden (generally problematic under the Free 
Exercise Clause). If, on the other hand, the government benefits 
religion as part of a more general category of benefits, or burdens 
religion as part of a more general category of burdens, neither clause 
is violated. Thus, religion clause doctrine seemingly fits together 
nicely, tracking a more general development in equality 
jurisprudence.1 However, there are some outlier cases in which the 
Rehnquist Court upheld special benefits for or special burdens on 
religion. These outlier cases are a window into a deeper inconsistency 
in religion clause doctrine. The outlier cases—and a proper 
understanding of why and when the Court views religion as 
foregrounded, rather than backgrounded, in Establishment Clause 
cases—remind us of the ways in which religion is distinctive. That 
 
 * Fordham University School of Law. 
 1. See Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW & RELIGION: A 
CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 226, 228–29 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000); see also Noah Feldman, 
From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 
673, 702 (2002) (connecting the rise of the endorsement test to the development of political 
equality as a constitutional value). 
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distinctiveness is not properly valued by a formal doctrine that 
matches general benefits (valid) against general burdens (valid), and 
special benefits (invalid) against special burdens (invalid). What we 
take away from religion by the cases that invalidate religion-favoring 
governmental action is not offset by those that invalidate religion-
disfavoring governmental action. We need a broader conception of 
free exercise to compensate for the ways in which the doctrine 
(properly, in my judgment) treats religion as distinctive under the 
Establishment Clause. 
This argument can be better understood by considering that the 
cornerstone of the Rehnquist Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence was Justice O’Connor’s endorsement test, which 
focuses on whether government action would be perceived by a 
reasonable observer as endorsing religion or a particular religion, i.e., 
whether it would be perceived as advancing a contested view of 
religious truth.2 Such endorsement makes non-adherents to the 
government’s position feel excluded as second-class citizens, unable 
to share the dominant doctrinal perspective and therefore shut out 
from full citizenship. Justice O’Connor never fully explained how 
government endorsement of religion works this harm, but here is one 
version of the argument: If the government endorses a contested 
version of religious truth and religion is generally understood to 
speak to ultimate, foundational truths,3 those who do not share the 
government’s perspective will reasonably feel disconnected from this 
truth (one type of harm) or from a full ability to influence the actions 
of their governmental agents (another type of harm). This is 
especially so because religion involves the belief in an extra-human 
source of normative authority, and reference to such authority in the 
governmental arena excludes non-believers from an equal ability to 
participate.4 These are powerful concerns, and the Court has 
 
 2. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 773–74 (1995) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); County of Allegheny v. 
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 627–32 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 3. See Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 90 (2002). 
 4. See Greene, supra note 1, at 230–34; Abner S. Greene, Is Religion Special? A 
Rejoinder to Scott Idleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 535 [hereinafter Greene, Is Religion Special?]; 
Abner S. Greene, The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1614–25 
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appropriately invalidated laws that raise them. The Rehnquist Court’s 
key contribution to Free Exercise Clause doctrine—its refusal to 
recognize a free exercise problem with laws that burden religion as 
part of a general category of burdened activity—appears to match its 
practice of upholding laws that benefit religion as part of a general 
category of benefited activity against Establishment Clause 
challenge. However, this weakened Free Exercise Clause is not the 
appropriate fit for an Establishment Clause that invalidates laws that 
harm one’s ability to participate as a full citizen.5 Such doctrine 
works a corresponding harm on those who would use the government 
to openly advance what they believe to be the ultimate, foundational 
truth, based in religion. The partial gag rule on religious speech 
resulting from an Establishment Clause doctrine that appropriately 
limits the role of the government in advancing religious ideas is not 
sufficiently remedied by a Free Exercise Clause doctrine that merely 
attends to intentional discrimination against religion. A more robust 
system of exemptions (and accommodations) is needed.6 
 
(1993) [hereinafter Greene, Political Balance]; see also Abner S. Greene, Constitutional 
Reductionism, Rawls, and the Religion Clauses, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2089, 2096–98 (2004) 
[hereinafter Greene, Constitutional Reductionism]; Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground: A 
Review of POLITICAL LIBERALISM by John Rawls and LIFE’S DOMINION by Ronald Dworkin, 62 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646, 657–66 (1994) [hereinafter Greene, Uncommon Ground]; cf. 
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General 
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1546–49 (2000) (discussing the expressive theory of 
Establishment Clause harm). 
 5. See Greene, supra note 1, at 234–38; Greene, Political Balance, supra note 4, at 
1633–40; see also Greene, Constitutional Reductionism, supra note 4, at 2098–103; Greene, 
Uncommon Ground, supra note 4, at 666–73. 
 6. To her credit, Justice O’Connor understood this—in addition to developing and 
applying the endorsement test, she supported the view that the Free Exercise Clause sometimes 
requires exemptions, even from generally applicable laws. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 892–903 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Souter also 
appears to share this set of views. See infra text accompanying notes 92–96, 144. For other 
views agreeing that formal equality fails to capture the way in which the religion clauses treat 
religion as distinctive, but without sharing my argument for a “political balance” to limit the 
role of expressly religious argumentation in lawmaking, offset by a robust system of judicial 
exemptions for religious practice, see Thomas C. Berg, Slouching Towards Secularism: A 
Comment on Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet, 44 EMORY L.J. 433, 447 (1995); Michael 
W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 3, 11 (2000). 
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II. THE APPARENTLY CONSISTENT DOCTRINE 
If we focus, at least at first glance, on the generality/specificity 
criterion, the doctrine is surprisingly consistent. The main Rehnquist 
Court development for both religion clauses was to ascertain whether 
the law in question backgrounded or foregrounded religion. 
Backgrounding means that the government does not single out 
religion, and therefore its actions are constitutional; foregrounding 
means the opposite. Under one view of neutrality (and there are 
many), this is precisely the correct focus. Under this view—what one 
might call formal neutrality7—the political branches and the judiciary 
can best stay out of the way of religion by following a clear rule of 
formal equal treatment.8 This theory is not the best for protecting 
minority religions, however, and this should give us initial pause as 
to whether generality (i.e., formal neutrality) really captures a core 
concern of the religion clauses.9 Majorities will find it easy to include 
religious recipients in a larger class of beneficiaries—for example, a 
school vouchers program would likely not be enacted unless 
mainstream religious groups were supportive and significant 
beneficiaries. Also, when laws only incidentally burden religion, it is 
minorities, not majorities, who are most likely to be harmed because 
the regulated practices will rarely be those the majority religion holds 
 
 7. See Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1 (1961). 
 8. Another version of neutrality—what we might call “substantive neutrality”—argues 
that government preserves religious freedom best by providing neither an incentive nor a 
deterrent to religious belief or practice. See Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 694, 732 (1997); Berg, supra note 6, at 451; Douglas Laycock, 
Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes 
but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 156, 243 (2004); Michael W. McConnell & 
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1 (1989); Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that Religious Arguments 
Should Be Excluded from Democratic Deliberation, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 639, 643; McConnell, 
supra note 6, at 38. This view looks beneath the formal surface of the government’s action to its 
effects. 
 9. See Thomas C. Berg, Minority Religions and the Religion Clauses, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 
919 (2004). For another critique of the formal neutrality (or equality) view, see Steven H. 
Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9 (2004) 
(arguing that formal equality cannot fully explain the doctrine because many values underlie 
both religion clauses). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/10
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dear.10 Under the formal neutrality view, neither action—religious 
benefits that happen to offer significant help for religious majorities 
(as part of a secular plus religious beneficiary group and without 
formally excluding religious minorities), or religious burdens that 
happen to significantly burden religious minorities (as incidental 
burdens from generally applicable laws, thereby formally burdening 
both religious and secular practice and both majority and minority 
religions)—is unconstitutional. 
A. Establishment Clause: Constitutional Because Part of a General 
Package 
On the Establishment Clause side, the Rehnquist Court built on 
earlier opinions and developed the focus on whether benefits to 
religion are part of a more general benefits program. Mueller v. 
Allen11 and Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the 
Blind12 already started in this direction, but the Rehnquist Court 
cemented generality as the key to upholding benefits programs in 
Bowen v. Kendrick,13 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District,14 
Agostini v. Felton,15 Mitchell v. Helms,16 and Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris.17  
Kendrick upheld the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) against 
a facial constitutional challenge.18 The AFLA provided federal grants 
“to public or nonprofit private organizations or agencies ‘for services 
and research in the area of premarital adolescent sexual relations and 
 
 10. See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1133–36 (1990). But cf. Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for 
Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1542–44 (1999) (approving of laws that 
incidentally burden minority religions more than majority religions). Majorities will, though, 
sometimes burden majoritarian religious practice as part of a general law not directed at 
religion; this possibility becomes important for my “political balance” argument, as sketched 
below, see infra text accompanying note 179, and as detailed by Greene, supra note 1, at 235–
37; Greene, Political Balance, supra note 4, at 1636–39. 
 11. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983). 
 12. Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs., 474 U.S. 481 (1986). 
 13. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988). 
 14. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). 
 15. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 16. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 17. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 18. See Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 589. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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pregnancy.’”19 The focus of the case was on abstinence-centered 
education services. Recipients expressly included religious 
organizations, as part of a wider ambit of public and private 
recipients.20 Although leaving open the possibility of as-applied 
challenges to the use of such funds to advance religious doctrine 
regarding sexual behavior,21 the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, held that “nothing on the face of the [AFLA] suggests it is 
anything but neutral with respect to the grantee’s status as a sectarian 
or purely secular institution.”22 
Zobrest upheld the provision of a sign-language interpreter to 
accompany a deaf student to classes in a Roman Catholic high 
school.23 The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 
requires public and private (secular and religious) schools to provide 
such assistance. The Court held, in another opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, that “[t]he service at issue in this case is part of a general 
government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child 
qualifying as ‘handicapped’ under the IDEA, without regard to the 
‘sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature’ of the school the 
child attends.”24 As an additional factor supporting the formal 
neutrality of the governmental aid, the IDEA accords “parents 
freedom to select a school of their choice.”25 Thus, the benefits are 
available generally, and whether they are used in a religious school 
depends on parental choice. 
Aguilar v. Felton26 involved a challenge to federal Title I funds, 
which go to public or private schools to support children who need 
remedial education, guidance, and job counseling. Although the law 
requires that the provided services be secular, New York City 
provided services at private schools, including religious schools, 
because of difficulties in providing services to private school children 
at public schools. The Court invalidated this practice, but it later 
 
 19. Id. at 593 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97–161, at 1 (1981)). 
 20. See id. at 604–05. 
 21. See id. at 618–22; see also id. at 622–24 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 22. Id. at 608 (majority opinion). 
 23. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 14 (1993). 
 24. Id. at 10. 
 25. Id. 
 26. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). 
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overruled Aguilar in Agostini.27 Justice O’Connor, writing for the 
majority, explained that the Court over the years had “abandoned the 
presumption . . . that the placement of public employees on parochial 
school grounds inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-
sponsored indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between 
government and religion.”28 Direct governmental aid to the 
educational function of religious schools was not invalid because the 
aid was given generally to underprivileged students, and the only 
reason it reached parochial schools was that the parents chose to send 
their children there rather than to public or secular, private schools.29 
According to the Court, such an aid program provides no incentive to 
“undertake religious indoctrination,” because the “aid is allocated on 
the basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor 
religion, and is made available to both religious and secular 
beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory basis.”30 
The focus on the generality of the funding program was front and 
center in Mitchell v. Helms,31 in which a plurality asserted that 
generality is sufficient to uphold such programs. Federal Chapter 
Two funds go to state and local government agencies for use in 
lending secular educational materials and equipment to public and 
private schools.32 The Mitchell Court upheld this arrangement as 
applied to loans to private, religious schools. In so doing, the Court 
overruled precedent invalidating similar programs based on the risk 
that public funds would be diverted to religious use.33 Although a 
majority reached this conclusion, the plurality, per Justice Thomas, 
focused on “the principle of neutrality, upholding aid that is offered 
to a broad range of groups or persons without regard to their 
religion.”34 Private parental choice as to where to educate their 
children provides a means of “assuring neutrality.”35 Justice 
 
 27. Id., overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
 28. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223. 
 29. See id. at 225–26, 228. 
 30. Id. at 231. 
 31. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 32. See id. at 801–02. 
 33. See id. at 808, 835 (overruling Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), and Wolman v. 
Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)); see also id. at 837 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 34. Id. at 809 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 829. 
 35. Id. at 810; see also id. at 829. 
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O’Connor’s opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice 
Breyer, refused to accept either neutrality or generality as dispositive 
in cases such as this; the three dissenters agreed with O’Connor on 
this point.36 One should note, however, that Justice O’Connor never 
voted to invalidate a governmental funding program that provides 
support to religious schools as part of a larger category of schools. 
The most recent—and arguably most important37—of the cases 
involving public funds running to religious schools is Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris.38 Ohio enacted the Pilot Project Scholarship 
Program, which provided tuition aid for students in kindergarten 
through eighth grade for use in secular or religious private schools in 
a school district under state control pursuant to a federal court order; 
Cleveland was the only such district. The aid could also be used in 
any public school in an adjacent school district. The Program also 
provided tutorial aid, in significantly lower amounts than the tuition 
aid, for use in public schools in a district under court order.39 In 
determining the appropriate level of generality for examining the 
Program, the Court looked to other Ohio programs that help 
Cleveland’s school children. The Court concluded that, following 
Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest, “the program challenged here is a 
program of true private choice,” and that it is “neutral in all respects 
toward religion” because it is “part of a general and multifaceted 
undertaking by the State of Ohio to provide educational opportunities 
to the children of a failed school district.”40 Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence—providing the fifth vote for Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
majority opinion—elaborated on the appropriate level of generality, 
supporting the Court’s “conclusion that this inquiry should consider 
all reasonable educational alternatives to religious schools that are 
available to parents.”41 
The caselaw in this area leaves open as-applied challenges to the 
provision of public funds for religious indoctrination in religious 
 
 36. See id. at 837–40 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 878–84 (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 37. See Laycock, supra note 8, at 167. 
 38. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 39. For a description of the facts, see id. at 644–48. 
 40. Id. at 653. 
 41. Id. at 663 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/10
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schools or for social service programs run by religious institutions. 
Justice O’Connor, in particular, insisted that these challenges remain 
open; this was key to her Kendrick and Mitchell concurrences.42 
Although the aid is part of a general program that includes secular 
and religious recipients and it is, on its face, secular, any religious use 
of such aid would nonetheless violate the Establishment Clause’s 
proscription against governmental religious indoctrination. But 
Zelman—and Mueller and Witters before it43—involved public funds 
flowing to both the secular and religious aspects of private, religious 
school education. So why do such funds not violate Justice 
O’Connor’s Kendrick/Mitchell insistence against as-applied uses of 
otherwise general funds for religious indoctrination? This is where 
the parental choice aspect comes into play—the public funds in this 
trio of cases went to religious schools only because of parental 
choice, which could also channel the funds to non-religious schools. 
It’s not clear how important the direct/indirect line is here—i.e., 
whether it matters that funds first pass through the parents’ hands, 
and then benefit the schools. What is important is that the parental 
choice cuts the chain of causation, as it were, between the 
government’s funds and the religious school’s ability to convey 
religious teachings. This is why Justice O’Connor can say, in 
Mitchell, that even a general, neutral government funding program 
would be invalid if the funds are paid on a per capita basis from the 
government coffers to the schools without intervening parental choice 
directing the funds to one place or another. Such an arrangement 
raises endorsement concerns, says Justice O’Connor.44 If this 
 
 42. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840–41, 857 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 622–24 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Agostini 
v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 226 (1997); Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 618–22. 
 43. Zobrest is often mentioned as part of this group, and indeed the sign language 
interpreter did interpret religion classes as well as secular classes; however, arguably this is not 
use of government funds for religious indoctrination because the sign language interpreter just 
conveyed what he was hearing. The money made available through the programs in Mueller, 
Witters, and Zelman was used by religious institutions to convey, inter alia, their religious 
doctrine because it is what they want to inculcate; the sign language interpreter, strictly 
speaking, wanted to inculcate nothing. Whether Zobrest is or is not properly grouped with these 
other cases is not, however, a matter of great importance. 
 44. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842–44 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also 
Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L. REV. 
1071, 1096 (2002); Laycock, supra note 8, at 166, 181. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p225 Greene book pages.doc  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
234 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 21:225 
 
 
distinction holds, it is again because we have reconfigured the 
appropriate level of generality—we see a general funding program 
when parents are choosers, whereas we see government sponsorship 
of religious indoctrination when the government pays per capita 
funds, even if such funds go to both religious and non-religious 
schools. For purposes of my argument in this Article, whether this 
distinction is analytically satisfying is less important than what it says 
about the Court’s lingering concern over the perception that 
government is going beyond helping an array of children obtain a 
quality education (permissible), and instead is seeking to advance 
religious ideas (impermissible). This end is precisely what the Court 
deems the Establishment Clause to forbid in the cases that invalidated 
laws as insufficiently general. Also, this central concern of the 
Rehnquist Court—e.g., with laws that place or appear to place the 
government’s imprimatur behind religious doctrine—helps reveal 
why the Court’s apparently parallel Free Exercise Clause doctrine, 
which also focuses on whether laws affect religion as part of a 
general package or in a more targeted fashion, in fact fails to match 
properly with the way in which its Establishment Clause doctrine 
limits the role of government in advancing religion. 
In addition to the parochial school funding cases, the Rehnquist 
Court also held that the government may provide either space or 
funds to religious speakers without violating the Establishment 
Clause, so long as the space or funds are provided more generally as 
well. The Rehnquist Court cases in this line45 were Board of 
Education v. Mergens,46 Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union 
Free School District,47 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors,48 and 
Good News Club v. Milford Central School.49 These cases began as 
Free Speech Clause cases;50 the Court held that once the government 
has created a forum for private speech and defined it sufficiently 
 
 45. The key pre-Rehnquist Court case in this line is Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 
(1981). 
 46. Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). 
 47. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 48. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 49. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 50. Except Mergens, which held that a federal statute required equal access for religious 
groups to school facilities during non-instructional time. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 234–37. 
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generally, it may not exclude religious speech because doing so 
would constitute discrimination based on speech content. Such 
discrimination is permissible only if it is supported by a compelling 
state interest; in these cases, the Court rejected the argument that the 
government has a compelling interest in avoiding an Establishment 
Clause violation. The Court reasoned that providing space or funds 
for religious or secular speech on an equal basis does not show 
governmental favoritism toward religion. Instead, it shows that the 
government plays by basic Free Speech Clause public forum rules. 
The generality of the benefit was key to these outcomes.51  
One hard question posed by these cases is whether the 
government may define a speech forum (either space or funding) 
sufficiently narrowly so as to properly exclude religious speech. It’s 
one thing for the government to open an auditorium for speech, 
subject only to content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions—in 
this situation, there’s no good reason to exclude religious speech, 
unless the Establishment Clause absolutely prohibits the use of 
government facilities or funds for religious speech. But it’s another 
thing for the government to fund only student publications regarding 
(for example) music, art, sports, and the like, but to exclude political 
and religious publications52 on the ground that such funding would 
entangle the government in partisan/sectarian controversies it wishes 
to avoid. The Rehnquist Court, however, did not distinguish the truly 
open public forum from the more limited forum; in both instances, 
 
 51. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114 (“The Good News Club seeks nothing more 
than to be treated neutrally and given access to speak about the same topics as are other 
groups.”); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 840 (“The governmental program here is neutral toward 
religion.”); id. at 847 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting “neutrality” and “generally applicable 
program”); id. at 850 (noting that “widely divergent viewpoints” of the various funded student 
publications make “improbable any perception of government endorsement of the religious 
message”); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (“The District property has repeatedly been used by 
a wide variety of private organizations. Under these circumstances, . . . there would have been 
no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or 
any particular creed . . . .”); Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248 (plurality opinion) (“[M]essage is one of 
neutrality rather than endorsement. . . .”); id. at 250 (noting that “secondary school students are 
mature enough and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or support student 
speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory basis”); id. at 252 (noting the “broad 
spectrum of officially recognized student clubs”); id. (“To the extent that a religious club is 
merely one of many different student-initiated voluntary clubs, students should perceive no 
message of government endorsement of religion.”). 
 52. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825. 
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the government may not exclude religious speech, and the 
Establishment Clause is no bar to its inclusion.53 
Finally, the Rehnquist Court54 twice upheld government religious 
displays as not unconstitutionally endorsing religion on the ground 
that the display would be perceived by a reasonable observer as part 
of a larger package of displays, and therefore that the religious 
message would be backgrounded, rather than foregrounded.55 In 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU,56 the Court upheld the display of a 
Chanukah menorah “placed just outside the City-County Building, 
next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty.”57 Four Justices 
would have adopted an approach that would almost never invalidate 
governmental religious displays,58 so the case turned on the opinions 
of Justices Blackmun and O’Connor, who voted to uphold the 
 
 53. As in the public funding of religious schools cases, so here does the directness vel non 
of the funding seem to make a difference. In Rosenberger, the Court carefully explained—
almost certainly to hold Justice O’Connor’s vote, which was necessary to gain a majority—that 
the student activities fee, paid to private contractors to print the publications, was different from 
general tax funds that went directly to the coffers of the religious group. See id. at 840–42; see 
also id. at 848, 851–52 (O’Connor, J., concurring). As I suggest in the text above, see supra text 
accompanying notes 42–44, this distinction is awfully thin—if government spends general tax 
revenue on an array of student publications, why should it matter if the money goes directly to 
the student group, targeted for use in the publications, or to the printer of the publications? I 
wonder how long this direct/indirect line can withstand the pressure from the 
“generality/neutrality” motor at work in the caselaw. 
 54. For a prior case in this line, see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 55. In a third case, Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 
(1995), the Rehnquist Court upheld a privately sponsored, unattended display of a cross in a 
ten-acre, state-owned plaza surrounding the Ohio statehouse. Id. at 757–58, 770. Key to the 
decision was that the plaza was a public forum for speech, administered according to content-
neutral time, place, and manner rules. A plurality upheld the display because it was privately 
sponsored. See id. at 763–69 (Scalia, J.). A separate group of three Justices, in an opinion by 
Justice O’Connor, also upheld the display, but stated that they would examine private displays 
in such settings under the endorsement test to ensure that the reasonable observer would not 
perceive the display as that of the government. See id. at 773–78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment). 
 56. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 57. Id. at 578. 
 58. See id. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).  
Symbolic recognition . . . of religious faith may violate the [Establishment] Clause in 
an extreme case. . . . [T]he permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city 
hall [is invalid] . . . because such an obtrusive year-round religious display would place 
the government’s weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a 
particular religion. 
Id. 
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menorah, but on narrower grounds. Both applied the endorsement 
test. Justice Blackmun reasoned that “both Christmas and Chanukah 
are part of the same winter-holiday season, which has attained a 
secular status in our society.”59 Justice O’Connor put it this way: 
[T]he relevant question for Establishment Clause purposes is 
whether the city of Pittsburgh’s display of the menorah, the 
religious symbol of a religious holiday, next to a Christmas 
tree and a sign saluting liberty sends a message of government 
endorsement of Judaism or whether it sends a message of 
pluralism and freedom to choose one’s own beliefs.60 
Her answer: the latter. 
In one of the Rehnquist Court’s final religion clause cases, Van 
Orden v. Perry,61 a plurality of the Court, per Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, upheld “the display of a monument inscribed with the Ten 
Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds.”62 The plurality 
deemed the display to be an acknowledgment of the Ten 
Commandments’ role in U.S. history because of its religious, as well 
as secular, significance.63 Justice Breyer, concurring in the judgment, 
provided the necessary fifth vote for the outcome. He focused on the 
context of the display, “a large park containing 17 monuments and 21 
historical markers, all designed to illustrate the ‘ideals’ of those who 
settled in Texas and of those who have lived there since that time.”64 
Moreover, a largely secular group erected the display forty years ago, 
and it went unchallenged during those forty years.65 In sum, Justice 
Breyer believed that the display was fairly innocuous, part of a larger 
setting of monuments (the rest secular) with a secular founding and a 
significant history of a lack of divisiveness caused by the display. 
Although he did not specifically invoke the endorsement test, his 
reasoning was essentially that a reasonable observer would not 
conclude that the government endorsed religion with the display. 
 
 59. Id. at 616. 
 60. Id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 61. Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005). 
 62. Id. at 2858. 
 63. See id. at 2861–63. 
 64. Id. at 2870 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 65. See id. 
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These three areas of caselaw are of a piece:66 the government may 
support religion, so long as its support is part of a larger package of 
support for the secular as well. The Rehnquist Court upheld cases 
involving funding religious schools along with non-religious schools, 
providing speech forums for religious as well as non-religious 
speech, and displaying religious symbols in a setting in which the 
religiosity would be backgrounded to a broader secular context 
because, in all of these cases, the government treated religion not as 
distinctive, but rather as part of a more general array of points of 
view.67 
B. Establishment Clause: Unconstitutional Because Religion is 
Singled out 
The Rehnquist Court (with the Chief Justice joining none of the 
opinions discussed in this subsection) invalidated legislation under 
the Establishment Clause when the state appeared to favor religion 
over non-religion or to endorse a religious perspective or message.68 
The analytic difficulty with most of these cases is that the Court 
could have seen religion as part of a larger package, as it did with the 
cases discussed in the prior section.69 Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement test, or something very close to it, was dominant in most 
of the cases in which the Court invalidated laws under the 
Establishment Clause. This test sets the level of generality based on 
whether a reasonable observer, familiar with the relevant history (of 
the law or practice and of the setting), would view the challenged 
governmental action as endorsing religion.70 The test is about 
foregrounding and backgrounding; there is no “natural” or 
 
 66. See Laycock, supra note 8, at 169 (discussing the connection between the Zelman and 
Rosenberger lines). 
 67. For a critique of the cases permitting government funding of religious institutions, see 
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 
(2002). 
 68. Regarding the rule against governmental religious indoctrination, see Koppelman, 
supra note 3, at 88; Laycock, supra note 8, at 218–19. 
 69. See Berg, supra note 6, at 448–51; Gedicks, supra note 44, at 1099–100. But see 
Laycock, supra note 8, at 219. 
 70. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722, 2736–37 (2005); Capitol 
Square Review & Advisory Bd., 515 U.S. 753, 773–78 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part 
and concurring in the judgment). 
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analytically derivable appropriate level of generality. The caselaw 
distinguishes between situations in which the government appears to 
be advancing a general, secular endeavor, of which religion is a part, 
and situations in which the government appears to be advancing 
religion specially. The latter instances are especially troubling when 
the dominant religion or religions appear to be using governmental 
apparatus to advance their religious messages, viewpoints, or 
doctrine. 
Let us start with the two school prayer cases. In Lee v. Weisman,71 
the Court invalidated a Providence, Rhode Island, practice of 
permitting public school principals to “invite members of the clergy 
to offer invocation and benediction prayers as part of the formal 
graduation ceremonies for middle schools and for high schools.”72 
Four of the members of the majority would not have required proof 
of coercion; although they would deem coercion sufficient to 
invalidate the prayer practice,73 they also supported a broader, 
jurisdictional rationale,74 suggesting that it is inappropriate for 
government to bring religious worship into the public schools. Such a 
practice “conveys a message of exclusion to all those who do not 
adhere to the favored beliefs.”75 Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
Court and providing the critical fifth vote for the majority, nodded 
toward the jurisdictional rationale,76 but focused his argument on 
what he saw as illegitimate psychological coercion—psychological 
because the students were not required to attend their graduation 
ceremonies.77 Despite the fact that other, secular statements were also 
offered at the graduation ceremonies, the Court did not see the state-
 
 71. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 72. Id. at 580. 
 73. See id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (joined by Stevens & O’Connor, JJ.); id. at 
609 (Souter, J., concurring) (joined by Stevens & O’Conner, JJ.). 
 74. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural Restraint on 
Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998); see also Feldman, supra note 67, at 368 
(describing the Lockeian roots of the jurisdictional theory). 
 75. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also id. at 631 (Souter, J., 
concurring). 
 76. See id. at 589. 
 77. See id. at 586 (noting that attendance and participation at the graduation ceremony 
“are in a fair and real sense obligatory”); id. at 589–96, 599; see also Abner S. Greene, The 
Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451, 451–52, 458–63 (1995). 
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initiated prayer as part of a larger package of speech activities, but 
rather as a distinctive government-sponsored religious activity. 
The Court followed Lee in Santa Fe Independent School District 
v. Doe.78 In Santa Fe, the Court confronted a public school district 
policy of permitting student-led and -initiated prayer at home football 
games. The senior class voted on whether to have such prayer and 
selected which student should deliver the prayer. The combination of 
local government control over and majority vote to implement the 
policy led the Court, in an opinion by Justice Stevens, to declare the 
prayer policy unconstitutional.79 The opinion relied in part on an 
endorsement rationale80—i.e., that an objective observer would 
believe that the school sponsored a religious message, which is 
invalid because it sends a message to non-believers that they are not 
full members of the political community—and in part on a coercion 
rationale—focusing not on coercion to attend the games, but on the 
coercive effect on “those present to participate in an act of religious 
worship.”81 Again, the fact that prayer was only part of what was 
communicated from the public address system during the football 
games was irrelevant; state-sponsored prayer in this setting 
overwhelms any attempt at generalizing, and thus the prayer should 
be viewed by itself, rather than as part of a larger package. 
Another major Rehnquist Court case invalidating government 
advancement of religious doctrine in public schools was Edwards v. 
Aguillard.82 The Louisiana Creationism Act forbade “the teaching of 
the theory of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by 
instruction in ‘creation science.’”83 After a close look at the history 
behind the legislation, Justice Brennan, writing for a majority, 
concluded that there was “no clear secular purpose for the [Act].”84 
Rather, the “preeminent purpose of the Louisiana Legislature was 
clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being 
 
 78. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 79. See id. at 301–10. 
 80. See id. at 309–10. 
 81. Id. at 312. 
 82. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
 83. Id. at 581. 
 84. Id. at 585. 
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created humankind.”85 This is invalid for the same reason that 
government-sponsored prayer in public schools is invalid—both 
involve the government in fostering religious doctrine or worship, 
and therefore both violate a jurisdictional line, at least in the public 
school setting. Thus, the fact that Louisiana public schools teach 
much that is secular, and therefore that the teaching of creationism 
could have been seen as part of a larger package of government-
sponsored education, was irrelevant to the Court.86 
The Rehnquist Court twice invalidated government-sponsored 
religious symbols. In Allegheny,87 the Court invalidated a crèche 
display placed on the grand staircase of the county courthouse. An 
angel was at the apex of the display; no secular figures or decorations 
were placed on the staircase. A majority of the Court, with Justice 
Blackmun writing, said: 
Whether the key word is “endorsement,” “favoritism,” or 
“promotion,” the essential principle remains the same. The 
Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government 
from appearing to take a position on questions of religious 
belief or from “making adherence to a religion relevant in any 
way to a person’s standing in the political community.”88 
The setting of the crèche display made this an easy case for the 
majority. It noted that “[n]o viewer could reasonably think that [the 
crèche] occupies this location without the support and approval of the 
government.”89 In response to Justice Kennedy’s dissent, which 
referred in part to theistic references in the national motto and the 
pledge of allegiance, the Court wrote that “history cannot legitimate 
practices that demonstrate the government’s allegiance to a particular 
 
 85. Id. at 591; see also id. at 603, 608 (Powell, J., concurring) (focusing on the Act’s 
advancement of a particular religious belief). 
 86. A federal district judge recently applied the teachings of cases such as Edwards and its 
predecessor, Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968), in addition to endorsement test cases, 
in striking down an effort by the school board in Dover, Pennsylvania, to introduce “intelligent 
design” as an alternative to evolution. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area Sch. Dist., 400 F. Supp. 2d 
707 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
 87. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 88. Id. at 593–94 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
 89. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 599–600. 
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sect or creed.”90 Here, the absence of generality was critical—if the 
crèche were in a different location and were part of a larger holiday 
display (as in Lynch v. Donnelly91), the reasonable observer would 
not perceive the government as singling out religion for praise. In the 
school prayer and creationism cases, even though the prayer and 
creationism curricula were part of a broader set of government-
sponsored recitations and curricula, the perception of government 
endorsement of religion dominated. In the symbols cases, if the 
reasonable observer saw the religious symbol as part of a broader set 
of secular symbols, there would be no perception of endorsement. 
In McCreary County v. ACLU,92 the Court paid close attention to 
the history of two prominent Ten Commandments displays in county 
courthouses. Whatever one thinks about the connection between the 
Ten Commandments and the secular legal tradition, the first four 
commandments are expressly religious.93 Despite the counties’ 
attempts to surround the displays with copies of other documents 
connected to our legal and political history, the Court, per Justice 
Souter, held that “reasonable observers have reasonable memories,”94 
and that such observers would understand that the counties endorsed 
the religious aspects of the posted Ten Commandments.95 Justice 
Souter’s opinion contains the clearest explanation from the Court to 
date as to how the Establishment Clause inquiry into whether the 
government acted with an inappropriately predominant religious 
purpose is intertwined with the reasonable observer perspective. 
[I]n some of the cases in which establishment complaints 
failed, savvy officials had disguised their religious intent so 
 
 90. Id. at 603. 
 91. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. 
 92. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
 93. See id. at 2728 (“Thou shalt have no other gods before me”; “Thou shalt not make 
unto thee any graven images”; “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain”; 
“Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy.”). 
 94. Id. at 2737; see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 
780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he 
reasonable observer in the endorsement inquiry must be deemed aware of the history and 
context of the community and forum in which the religious display appears.”). 
 95. See McCreary, 125 S. Ct. at 2738 (“Where the text is set out, the insistence of the 
religious message is hard to avoid in the absence of a context plausibly suggesting a message 
going beyond an excuse to promote the religious point of view.”). 
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cleverly that the objective observer just missed it. But that is 
no reason for great constitutional concern. If someone in the 
government hides religious motive so well that the “‘objective 
observer, acquainted with the text, legislative history, and 
implementation of the statute,’” cannot see it, then without 
something more the government does not make a divisive 
announcement that in itself amounts to taking religious sides. 
A secret motive stirs up no strife and does nothing to make 
outsiders of nonadherents . . . .96 
In other words, in determining whether Establishment Clause 
harm exists, we must examine whether religion is perceived as the 
foregrounded, predominant purpose of the governmental action, or 
instead as part of a larger, secular background. The harm is the 
inability of the non-believers to share in what the dominant group 
says is ultimate truth, and the concomitant inability to participate 
fully in a government that claims a source of normative authority that 
is beyond the ability of the non-believers to grasp, at least from their 
different theistic, agnostic, or atheistic stance. 
In a 1993 article in the Yale Law Journal, I made an argument 
quite similar to Justice Souter’s in McCreary: 
 Requiring that laws have an express secular purpose rather 
than merely a plausible one might transform the legislative 
process in a way consistent with the dictates of the 
Establishment Clause. In some cases, the same laws will be 
passed that otherwise would have been passed, but pursuant to 
secular rather than religious argument. In other cases, the 
unavailability of a strong secular argument will mean that a 
law will not be passed. This transformation of the legislative 
process will eliminate the Establishment Clause injury of 
excluding nonbelievers from meaningful participation in the 
political process. That we see so many laws passed on the basis 
of secular argumentation, when religious arguments no doubt 
are stronger in the souls and minds of many legislators, is 
testament not to the fact that the Establishment Clause 
 
 96. Id. at 2735 (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)). 
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proscription on enacting faith into law will have little real-
world effect, but rather to the fact that it is already having such 
an effect. 
 Let me explain why I have not suggested forbidding laws 
based on an underlying religious purpose as well as those 
based on an expressly religious purpose. One can imagine four 
different situations: (1) a law is religious on its face; (2) a law 
not facially religious is enacted for an expressly religious 
purpose; (3) a law not facially religious is enacted for an 
expressly secular purpose that appears to be a pretext for the 
real purpose, which is religious; and (4) a law not facially 
religious is enacted for an expressly secular purpose that does 
not appear pretextual, but the real underlying purpose is 
religious. The first three types of law should be invalid under 
the Establishment Clause because they foreclose meaningful 
political participation by nonbelievers. All three laws are, in 
the terminology I am using in this Article, “expressly” 
religious. But if religious believers can translate their “true” 
religious reasons successfully enough to make it appear to 
nonbelievers that the secular reasons are the real ones, then 
from the nonbelievers’ perspective, their political participation 
is meaningful. One might argue that to be consistent, I should 
condemn even type (4) laws in principle and then acknowledge 
that the judiciary can’t enforce this condemnation because the 
true reasons behind the laws will be inaccessible to it. But my 
Establishment Clause argument does not condemn type (4) 
laws. It turns not on the underlying reasons for laws, but rather 
on the reasons that are apparent in the political process. 
Invalidating type (3) laws will cover all instances in which 
believers think they have successfully masked their true 
reasons, but have not. If a religious reason can be successfully 
translated into a secular one—if a nonbeliever sees the secular 
argument as one made in good faith, and finds the ensuing 
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debate meaningful—then the concern with exclusion from 
political participation is eliminated.97 
Two additional cases round out the Rehnquist Court’s 
Establishment Clause invalidations, and they are both unusual. In 
Board of Education v. Grumet,98 the state of New York had 
established a public school district at the behest of the parents of a 
group of handicapped children. The families lived in the Village of 
Kiryas Joel, “a religious enclave of Satmar Hasidim, practitioners of 
a strict form of Judaism.”99 Because Aguilar was still good law at the 
time, public funds to educate the handicapped children could not be 
used in private religious schools, and the children were doing poorly 
in the county schools.100 So, the state constituted the Village as a 
separate public school district; the Village School District then 
established a special education program for handicapped children, 
and handicapped Hasidic children came to the program from both 
inside and outside of the Village.101 There was no exclusion of other 
children by law, and there was no evidence (note that the case was 
decided on summary judgment) that the program was run in a 
religious fashion. Nonetheless, the Court struck down the law 
establishing the school district. Justice Souter, writing for a plurality, 
held that the district violated the principle that “a State may not 
delegate its civic authority to a group chosen according to a religious 
criterion.”102 The odd thing about this holding is that the delegated 
power went to the Village, not to the rabbis or synagogues,103 and 
there was no evidence in the record that the District was run on 
religious terms.104  
 
 97. Greene, Political Balance, supra note 4, at 1622–23 (citations omitted). 
 98. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994). 
 99. Id. at 690. 
 100. See id. at 692. 
 101. See id. at 693–94. 
 102. Id. at 698. 
 103. Thus the Court should have distinguished, rather than followed, Larkin v. Grendel’s 
Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982), in which state law gave veto power to churches, synagogues, 
and schools located within 500 feet of the premises of an applicant for a liquor license. See id. 
at 117. 
 104. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 19–20 (1996). 
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A majority of the Court also deemed the District invalid because it 
was a special accommodation for a single religious group, and there 
was “no assurance that the next similarly situated group seeking a 
school district of its own will receive one.”105 This holding was also 
odd because the Court has several times spoken approvingly of sect-
specific accommodations,106 because the Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence allows “one step at a time” legislative relief,107 and 
because a future denial of a school district could be challenged at that 
point.108 Justice Kennedy voted separately to invalidate the District 
on the ground that it constituted an act of religious gerrymandering. 
He wrote: “In this respect, the Establishment Clause mirrors the 
Equal Protection Clause. Just as the government may not segregate 
people on account of their race, so too it may not segregate on the 
basis of religion.”109 The problem with this argument is that the state 
established the District at the behest of a small religious group that 
wanted to live separately; it did not separate the group from others 
against its will.110 Despite the difficulties with the holding,111 Kiryas 
Joel stands as a Rehnquist Court Establishment Clause invalidation, 
with five votes concerned with the sect-specificity of the state action, 
without a clear showing that the state lifted a governmentally 
imposed burden on religious practice. 
Finally, based on a similar concern about special favoritism for 
religion, although here for religion generally rather than for a 
particular sect, the Court in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock112 
invalidated a Texas exemption from sales tax for religious 
periodicals. The primary concern of the Court—the majority 
consisted of three groups, comprising a total of six Justices—was the 
exemption’s lack of generality. Justice Brennan, writing for a 
plurality of three, held that the exemption “lacks sufficient 
 
 105. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 703; see also id. at 712–18 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment). 
 106. See Greene, supra note 104, at 78 n.315. 
 107. See id. at 61–63. 
 108. See Grumet, 512 U.S. at 722–27 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); Greene, 
supra note 104, at 60–61. 
 109. Grumet, 512 U.S. at 728. 
 110. See Greene, supra note 104, at 27–57. 
 111. See Berg, supra note 6. 
 112. Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). 
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breadth”;113 Justice White deemed the content-selectivity of the 
exemption a violation of the Free Press Clause;114 and Justice 
Blackmun, writing for two, shared Justice Brennan’s concern with 
the limited nature of the exemption, what he called the “preferential 
support for the communication of religious messages.”115 Kiryas Joel 
and Texas Monthly can both be read as straightforward Establishment 
Clause invalidations based on the lack of generality of the benefited 
group. The problem with this conclusion is that it rules out all 
religion-only accommodations. To combat that notion, Justice 
Brennan explained that a religion-only accommodation is permissible 
if it either lifts a burden on the free exercise of religion or does not 
impose a substantial burden on non-beneficiaries.116 The former was 
necessary to make sense of Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. 
Amos,117 which upheld a religion-only statutory exception from Title 
VII. The latter was necessary to make sense of Zorach v. Clauson,118 
which upheld a religion-only accommodation for releasing children 
early from public school to attend after-school religion classes 
elsewhere. 
I will not otherwise discuss Zorach, but Amos is an important 
Rehnquist Court religion clause case. It would make sense, in terms 
of my overall picture, if the Court construed the Free Exercise Clause 
to require religion-only exemptions from employment discrimination 
laws. However, Amos did not turn on what the Free Exercise Clause 
requires; this fact makes the religion-only accommodation upheld in 
Amos unusual, and it makes Amos one of the few cases during the 
Rehnquist Court era that doesn’t fit the pattern of generality versus 
specificity. It is an outlier case, but cannot be ignored. Instead, as I 
will argue in Part III, it and a few other outlier cases help us better 
 
 113. Id. at 14. 
 114. See id. at 26. 
 115. Id. at 28. 
 116. See id. at 18 n.8. 
 117. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). But cf. Christopher L. 
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act Is 
Unconstitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437, 455–56 (1994) (claiming that RFRA flunked Justice 
Brennan’s Texas Monthly test). 
 118. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). For an argument that the accommodation in 
Kiryas Joel satisfied Justice Brennan’s Texas Monthly test, see Greene, supra note 104, at 76–
82. 
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understand how religion is distinctive, and thus how the apparently 
consistent doctrine is, in fact, out of whack. 
C. Free Exercise Clause: Constitutional Because Not a Targeted 
Burden 
The most significant Rehnquist Court free exercise case was 
Employment Division v. Smith.119 The question in Smith was whether 
Oregon could constitutionally apply its criminal prohibition against 
possession of a controlled substance to the religious use of a drug.120 
The Native American Church has a long-established practice of 
ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purposes. 
The Court reviewed its Free Exercise Clause cases and concluded 
that it had invalidated generally applicable laws that did not target 
religion in only two settings—unemployment benefits cases and 
cases in which the free exercise claim was packaged with another 
claim of constitutional right.121 The latter cases involved free exercise 
claims brought “in conjunction with other constitutional 
protections”122—so-called “hybrid” claims—such as free speech or 
press or parental rights to direct the education of their children. In the 
former cases—Sherbert v. Verner,123 Thomas v. Review Board,124 
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,125 and Frazee v. 
Illinois Department of Employment Security126—the Court 
“invalidated state unemployment compensation rules that conditioned 
the availability of benefits upon an applicant’s willingness to work 
 
 119. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 120. More precisely, the question was whether a State may deny unemployment 
compensation to workers fired from a drug rehabilitation organization on the ground that they 
had ingested an illegal drug, even though as part of a religious ceremony. See id. at 874. 
 121. See id. at 881–85. 
 122. Id. at 881. 
 123. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 124. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 125. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987). 
 126. Frazee v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989). Frazee was similar in 
structure to the prior three cases, but the actual issue before the Court was whether the fact that 
Frazee was not a member of an established religious sect was a sufficient reason to distinguish 
the other cases. The Court, per Justice White, held unanimously that it was not. See id. at 832–
35. 
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under conditions forbidden by his religion.”127 Hobbie and Frazee 
were Rehnquist Court decisions. However, these cases may not really 
involve generally applicable laws after all; the Smith Court hinted 
that it might take such a view by noting that the context of these cases 
“lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons 
for the relevant conduct.”128 In other words, the application of strict 
scrutiny in favor of the religious claimants in these cases might best 
be understood as a prophylactic device to prevent discrimination 
against religious reasons for being unable to work.129  
The Court stated that, apart from these two sets of cases, it had 
“never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from 
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the 
State is free to regulate.”130 To ask judges on a case-by-case basis to 
weigh the government’s interest in enforcing a generally applicable 
regulatory law against an individual’s free exercise claim would be 
“courting anarchy,”131 Justice Scalia wrote for the Smith majority. He 
added: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the 
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those 
religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that 
unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be 
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto 
itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all 
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs.132 
 
 127. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883. 
 128. Id. at 884. 
 129. See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Conscience: 
The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1245, 1277–82 
(1994); Laycock, supra note 8, at 204–05. 
 130. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79. The principal decision that seems inconsistent with this 
assertion is Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), “invalidating compulsory school-
attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their 
[high-school age] children to school.” 494 U.S. at 881 (footnote omitted). As Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Smith pointed out, Yoder expressly held that even regulatory 
laws of general applicability must give way to compelling free exercise claims, without limiting 
the holding or describing the claim as a “hybrid.” Id. at 895–97 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 131. Id. at 888 (majority opinion). 
 132. Id. at 890. 
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Smith is the perfect parallel, in terms of formal neutrality theory, 
to the Rehnquist Court cases upholding laws against Establishment 
Clause challenge. The focus in those cases was whether the benefit to 
religion was part of a larger package that could be described or 
reasonably perceived as secular. Just as a law that benefits religion as 
part of a more general category of benefits is valid, so is a law that 
burdens religion as part of a more general category of burdens. 
Three other Rehnquist Court cases are consistent with the general 
logic of Smith, although all were decided before it. In O’Lone v. 
Estate of Shabazz,133 the Court, per Chief Justice Rehnquist, refused 
to require an exemption from prison regulations that rendered some 
prisoners unable to attend weekly religious services.134 In Hernandez 
v. Commissioner,135 the Court, with Justice Marshall writing for the 
majority, interpreted certain payments to a church to not qualify as 
contributions or gifts for tax deduction purposes, and held that the 
law as interpreted violated neither religion clause because it did not 
formally differentiate among sects.136 In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries 
v. Board of Equalization,137 the Court, in an opinion by Justice 
O’Connor, upheld the application of a generally applicable sales and 
use tax on the distribution of religious materials by a religious 
organization.138 
The other Rehnquist Court case denying a free exercise claim that 
fits with the rest of the caselaw, although somewhat uneasily, is Lyng 
v. Northwest Indian Cemetary Protective Ass’n.139 At issue in Lyng 
was the U.S. Forest Service’s plan to build a road through a portion 
of forest that had “traditionally been used for religious purposes by 
members of three American Indian tribes in northwestern 
California.”140 Lyng did not involve a generally applicable law, but 
neither did it involve intentional discrimination. The government had 
neutral, non-discriminatory reasons for building the road in the 
 
 133. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
 134. See id. at 349–53. 
 135. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989). 
 136. See id. at 695–700. 
 137. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
 138. See id. at 384–97. 
 139. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 140. Id. at 441–42. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol21/iss1/10
p225 Greene book pages.doc  11/1/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2006]  The Apparent Consistency 251 
 
 
specific location, and Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, 
focused on the difficulties that would ensue were the Court to subject 
governmental land use decisions to case-by-case Free Exercise 
Clause scrutiny.141 
D. Free Exercise Clause: Unconstitutional Because a Targeted 
Burden 
In addition to the Rehnquist Court cases that continued the 
Warren and Burger Courts’ solicitude towards unemployment 
compensation claimants—cases that are best understood as protection 
against religious discrimination that can occur in a system of case-by-
case determinations as to the validity of an unemployment 
compensation claim—the Rehnquist Court decided one significant 
case involving targeted religious discrimination. The City of Hialeah, 
Florida, enacted a set of ordinances and exemptions that could only 
be understood to be directed at the Santeria practice of religious 
animal sacrifice. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah,142 the Court unanimously invalidated these ordinances, with 
Justice Kennedy writing for a majority for almost the entire 
opinion.143 The Court reasoned that the Hialeah ordinances lacked the 
generality and neutrality required to avoid strict Free Exercise Clause 
scrutiny, and easily concluded that the ordinances flunked this 
standard of review. Although joining much of the majority opinion 
and concurring in the result, Justice Souter—who was not on the 
Court when it decided Smith—wrote a long opinion suggesting that 
“the Court should reexamine the rule Smith declared.”144 Justice 
Blackmun, joined by Justice O’Connor, also wrote separately to 
declare his continued opposition to the Smith rule barring stepped-up 
 
 141. See id. at 451–53. 
 142. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
 143. Only Justice Stevens joined the portion of Justice Kennedy’s opinion that examined 
specific statements of city council members and argued that such evidence pointed to a possible 
Equal Protection Clause violation, as well as the violation of free exercise that the entire Court 
found. Id. at 540–42. 
 144. Id. at 559 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also City 
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544–65 (1997) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (calling for the 
reexamination of Smith); id. at 565–66 (Souter, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 566 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (same). 
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scrutiny to laws of general applicability that burden the free exercise 
of religion.145 
III. THE OUTLIER CASES 
So, with a few tweaks here and there, the Rehnquist Court religion 
clause caselaw is of a piece. Generality versus specificity is critical—
religion benefited or burdened as part of a more general class is 
permissible; religion targeted for (or seen as targeted for) a benefit or 
burden is impermissible. But three cases don’t fit this pattern. 
The Court in Amos146 and Cutter v. Wilkinson147 upheld statutes 
that benefited religion without including religion in a larger class of 
beneficiaries. The Court in Locke v. Davey148 upheld a statute that 
disadvantaged religion without including religion in a larger 
burdened class. These are outlier cases, at least if one views the 
remaining Rehnquist Court religion clause doctrine, as I have, by 
focusing on whether the government packages religion within a more 
general category of government action. They are explicable only by 
understanding, beyond the stated doctrine, the way in which the 
religion clauses exert pressure that limits what the government may 
do. This point, in turn, will lead me to consider earlier observations 
as to why Justices O’Connor and Souter are correct to be concerned 
about the exclusionary effect of governmental action that appears to 
constitute an attempt at religious indoctrination, and to support their 
concomitant (though not explicitly linked) arguments for a broader 
conception of free exercise than Smith allows. 
In Amos, the Court upheld an exception to Title VII’s proscription 
against employment discrimination. The exception permits a religious 
institution to discriminate in hiring in favor of individuals who share 
its religious faith. The plaintiff worked for the Mormon Church for 
sixteen years as a building engineer. He was fired because he was not 
a member of the Church. A prior version of the exception covered 
only the religious activities of religious institutions, and the Court 
 
 145. See Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 577–78 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 146. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 147. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 148. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). 
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assumed arguendo that the Free Exercise Clause required such an 
exception (there was no Supreme Court case directly on point), but 
no more.149 (This latter point clearly fits with Smith—if the 
government insisted on applying a general anti-discrimination law to 
all employers, religious and otherwise, without exception for 
institutions to hire co-worshipers for non-clergy positions, there 
would be no strict scrutiny and no Free Exercise Clause violation 
under the Smith doctrine.) Nonetheless, even though the statute did 
not extend the broader exception to discriminate on the basis of 
religion to non-religious institutions, the Court upheld the exception 
as applied, reasoning that “it is a significant burden on a religious 
organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict 
which of its activities a secular court will consider religious.”150 
Although acknowledging that the Title VII provision at issue 
benefited only religious institutions, the Court allowed this because 
the government acted “with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation 
that burdens the exercise of religion,”151 even though the Free 
Exercise Clause does not require such burden-lifting. In sum, 
according to Justice White, writing for the majority, there is some 
room between the two religion clauses for permissive 
accommodation, i.e., for laws that benefit religion specially but are 
not required by the Free Exercise Clause.152 
Cutter basically followed Amos. Part of the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 forbids the government 
from imposing a substantial burden on the religious practice of prison 
inmates, unless it can satisfy strict scrutiny.153 Even though the Free 
Exercise Clause does not require such an accommodation and the 
 
 149. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 338. 
 152. See id. at 334 (referring to and quoting from Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 
(1970)). For opposition to legislative accommodations of religion, see Eisgruber & Sager, supra 
note 117, at 449, 455–56; Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 129; Gedicks, supra note 44, at 1073 
n.7, 1106; Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against 
Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555 (1991). For support, see 
Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Volokh, supra 
note 10 (with the understanding that the legislature reserves the power to override judicial 
precedent under such accommodation statutes). 
 153. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 712 (2005). 
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accommodation runs to religious, not secular, practice, the Court, per 
Justice Ginsburg, once again held that there is a “corridor between 
the Religion Clauses.”154 In both the Amos and Cutter settings, the 
government created a burden on religious practice (without actually 
violating the Free Exercise Clause) by requiring religious 
organizations to ignore the religions of those they employ, and by 
depriving prisoners of liberty in a way that has a direct impact on the 
ability to practice their religion. Thus, in both settings, the 
government may lift such burdens—again, even though doing so is 
not required by the Free Exercise Clause and even though the 
government does not lift similar secular burdens. 
Finally, the Court in Davey, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, held: 
The State of Washington established the Promise Scholarship 
Program to assist academically gifted students with 
postsecondary education expenses. In accordance with the 
State Constitution, students may not use the scholarship at an 
institution where they are pursuing a degree in devotional 
theology. We hold that such an exclusion from an otherwise 
inclusive aid program does not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment.155 
The first thing to note is that, if Washington wanted to, it could 
include students of devotional theology156 in a general post-secondary 
scholarship program without violating the Establishment Clause. This 
is clear from the caselaw up to and including Zelman, and Chief 
Justice Rehnquist said as much in his opinion.157 Second, only 
devotional theology is omitted from the otherwise general scholarship 
program—thus, religion is singled out for disadvantage. This case is 
the inverse of Amos and Cutter. But why didn’t the singling out of 
devotional theology violate the Free Exercise Clause, as the singling 
out of religious practice did in Lukumi? The Court reasoned that the 
Washington exclusion “imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions 
 
 154. Id. at 720. 
 155. Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004). 
 156. See Laycock, supra note 8, at 168. 
 157. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 719. 
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on any type of religious service or rite”;158 i.e., “[t]he State has 
merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.”159 This 
distinction between a direct penalty and the refusal to fund is not new 
to Davey,160 but it is not terribly satisfying. Would the Court 
invalidate a special tax on the study of devotional theology, but 
uphold an exception for the study of devotional theology from an 
otherwise general scholarship program? 
The other difficulty with Davey is how it handled the Rosenberger 
caselaw. Recall that in a consistent line of cases, the Court held that if 
the government opens a forum for speech—either physical space or 
through funding—it may not then exclude religious speech from the 
forum. Such exclusion violates the content-neutrality principle of the 
Free Speech Clause; further, including religious speech in an open 
forum does not violate the Establishment Clause because a 
reasonable observer would not think that the government is endorsing 
the religious speech, but rather that it is simply opening a forum for 
various types of speech. So why did the Washington theology 
exclusion not violate the Rosenberger principle? Here is the Court’s 
entire answer: “[T]he . . . Program is not a forum for speech. The 
purpose of the . . . Program is to assist students from low- and 
middle-income families with the cost of postsecondary education, not 
to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.”161 This 
would be a straightforward conclusion were the state program one by 
which to feed the hungry or tend to the sick. In such a case, the 
exclusion of religious programs would not violate the Free Speech 
Clause. However, education is all about speech—it’s about reading, 
writing, speaking, listening, and learning. In fact, many First 
Amendment cases discuss the special role of academic institutions in 
advancing free speech values, and such cases often give special 
protection (albeit often in dicta) to such institutions.162 The Davey 
holding limits the advance of the education vouchers movement—
such vouchers, as applied to private, religious schools, are now 
 
 158. Id. at 720. 
 159. Id. at 721. 
 160. See Laycock, supra note 8, at 158, 171, 178, 193, 200, 214, 216. 
 161. Locke, 540 U.S. at 720 n.3 (quotation and citation omitted). 
 162. See Laycock, supra note 8, at 191 and n.221. 
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permissible under the Establishment Clause if part of a general 
program, but required by neither the Free Exercise Clause nor the 
Free Speech Clause.163 But it’s not clear that the Rosenberger case 
line and Davey can so easily coexist.164 
Without suggesting that the Court will overrule the Rosenberger 
line of cases (it seems too well-established), consider how Davey 
went out of its way to discuss the distinctiveness of religion. The 
Court rejected the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clause arguments 
through formal maneuvers—e.g., funding denial doesn’t equal a 
regulatory burden; a scholarship program doesn’t assist speech. 
However, the Court said more: “training for religious professions and 
training for secular professions are not fungible”;165 “the subject of 
religion is one in which both the United States and state constitutions 
embody distinct views—in favor of free exercise, but opposed to 
establishment—that find no counterpart with respect to other callings 
or professions”;166 “early state constitutions saw no problem in 
explicitly excluding only the ministry from receiving state dollars”;167 
and “religious instruction is of a different ilk.”168 These comments 
about the distinctiveness of religion suggest that Davey was decided 
under pressure from Establishment Clause values—pressure to 
protect against religious indoctrination via the government—just as 
Amos and Cutter were decided under pressure from Free Exercise 
Clause values—pressure to protect against the government’s 
burdening of private religious practice. That is, these cases suggest 
the residual power of a broader conception of religion as distinctive, 
beyond those cases in which the Court invalidated state action that 
singled out religion for special burden or benefit. This leads me back, 
in the next section, to the endorsement test, and to why a reasonable 
perception of exclusion matters to an Establishment Clause analysis. 
The way in which religion is (properly, in my judgment) treated as 
distinctive when excluding it from being the express, predominant 
 
 163. Cf. id. at 172 (noting that Davey’s argument was applicable to a program that chooses 
to fund private schools, but not if the state funds public schools only). 
 164. See id. at 194–95. 
 165. Locke, 540 U.S. at 721. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 723. 
 168. Id. 
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feature of government action for Establishment Clause purposes—in 
cases such as Lee, Santa Fe, Edwards, Allegheny (crèche), and 
McCreary—means that we should have a more robust Free Exercise 
Clause doctrine than Smith allows. The distinctiveness of religion—
brought into sharp relief by Amos, Cutter, and Davey—cannot be 
sufficiently cashed out by a religion clause doctrine focused on 
whether the government’s treatment of religion is properly part of a 
general package or improperly a targeted benefit or burden. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Amos, Cutter, and Davey remind us that religion is distinctive—or 
at least is treated as such by our constitutional law—and help show 
that a doctrine focused on generality versus specificity cannot fully 
capture such distinctiveness. But how, precisely, is religion 
distinctive? We can start by taking another look at the public school 
prayer cases, the creationism in public schools case, and the cases 
involving government sponsorship of religious symbols in which the 
religiosity is foregrounded. In each of these cases, the Court 
recognized an Establishment Clause harm, but refused to recognize 
what would be the precisely parallel secular harm. We do not forbid 
public school teachers to lead secular recitations, but we forbid them 
to lead prayer; we do not forbid the teaching of evolution in public 
schools, but we forbid the teaching of creationism; we allow the 
government to sponsor all manner of secular symbols (and even 
religious symbols when the religiosity is backgrounded), but we 
invalidate government sponsorship of foregrounded religious 
symbols. In short, we have a robust commitment to secular 
government speech,169 but an Establishment Clause doctrine that 
invalidates many instances of religious government speech. There is a 
good reason for this doctrinal divergence. Religion appeals to an 
extra-human source of normative authority, and those who don’t 
share the dominant religion will reasonably believe themselves to be 
cut off from access to that ultimate truth and will, accordingly, 
reasonably feel excluded from fully participating in government 
 
 169. See Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2000); Abner S. 
Greene, Government Speech on Unsettled Issues, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1667 (2001). 
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when governing is based on express references to such authority.170 
This is, of course, a disputed matter. Some argue that if religion is 
based on faith, it is no more so than many secular beliefs. Others 
argue that religion is based just as much on reason as is much secular 
belief. I won’t go through these debates here.171 Our doctrine is based 
on treating religion as distinctive in Establishment Clause cases, and 
the distinction between an appeal to an extra-human authority and 
other appeals captures the way in which the Court—particularly 
Justices O’Connor and Souter—views the Establishment Clause harm 
in these key cases.172 
 
 170. See supra note 4; cf. Feldman, supra note 1, at 704 (describing the political process 
theory behind the endorsement test: “Courts should overrule democratic enactments concerning 
religion when they would have the effect of disadvantaging citizens in their political 
participation by rendering their religious affiliation relevant to their political standing.”). 
Sometimes scholars who do not agree that expressly religious arguments should be treated 
differently from secular ones in the lawmaking process nonetheless share my view that religious 
belief exists on a different plane from secular belief. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 6, at 18 
(“I personally incline toward the essentialist explanation, believing that matters of the spirit are 
fundamentally outside the sphere of force and coercion, which is the province of the state.”); id. 
at 24 (“The government cannot be a competent judge of religious truth because there is no 
reason to believe that religious understanding has been vouchsafed to the majority, or to any 
governmental elite.”). 
 171. See Greene, supra note 1, at 229–32; Greene, Is Religion Special?, supra note 4; 
Greene, Political Balance, supra note 4, at 1614–20; see also Esbeck, supra note 74, at 67–68; 
Eric A. Posner, The Legal Regulation of Religious Groups, 2 LEGAL THEORY 33, 35 (1996). But 
see Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 763 (1993); Scott C. Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation: A Reply to Professor Greene’s 
Theory of the Religion Clauses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 337; McConnell, supra note 8. 
 172. Noah Feldman contends that the endorsement test focuses on symbolic diminution of 
political equality and the identity of the religious minority, but not on substantive exclusion 
from politics. “It is perfectly common,” Feldman argues, “for religious majorities to use 
substantive values to inform their political choices, and the endorsement test provides no 
protection against such an outcome.” Feldman, supra note 1, at 712. “[P]olitical self-realization 
does not require special protection,” he maintains. Id. at 709. You win some and you lose some 
in politics, implies Feldman, and if your losses are as a religious minority, that is no different 
from losing generally in the political/lawmaking process. My argument that there is a “political 
balance” to the religion clauses depends upon precisely the opposite contention: that expressly 
religious arguments in the lawmaking process appeal to an extra-human source of normative 
authority, rendering them different in kind from expressly secular arguments and producing a 
kind of exclusion of religious minorities to which political process theory properly pays 
attention. Indeed, my Yale Law Journal piece on this subject begins with the following 
observation: if religious arguments may properly play an equal role to secular arguments in the 
lawmaking process, then indeed religious “players” win some and lose some, and thus the 
predicate for judicially mandated exemptions—that the government may not fully bind those 
whose arguments have not been allowed full voice in lawmaking—would disappear. See 
Greene, Political Balance, supra note 4, at 1611. What both the purpose prong of the Lemon 
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This singling out of religious appeals in the government sector is 
not properly matched doctrinally by protecting against governmental 
singling out of religion for disfavor. When we—quite properly, in my 
judgment—treat religion as distinctive by excluding it from being the 
dominant force in the governmental arena, we simultaneously limit 
the ability of religious citizens to advance what they believe to be 
true. They can do so outside of government, of course, and can even 
do so in politics generally. However, they cannot do so if it will result 
in a law being seen as expressly and predominantly based on 
religious argumentation.173 This is the lesson of Epperson v. 
Arkansas,174 Edwards,175 Wallace v. Jaffree,176 and, most recently 
and most powerfully, McCreary.177 In addition, they cannot do so 
through teacher-led religious recitation (i.e., prayer) in public 
schools, nor through advancement of their preferred religious 
doctrines (e.g., creationism) in such schools. However, reading the 
Establishment Clause in this fashion harms religious citizens. We 
have properly stripped down the governmental sector from religious 
indoctrination. The compensation would be to strip down religious 
practice from governmental regulation. Our Establishment Clause 
doctrine has limited religious citizens’ speech and their input into the 
governmental sector, and, by any credible theory of political 
legitimacy, we have thus rendered governmental outputs over such 
citizens less than fully legitimate. In such a system, the government 
can no longer claim that neutral laws of general applicability must be 
followed by all. Exemptions for religious citizens—at least as a prima 
facie matter—are needed to offset the limits we have placed on 
 
test, see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), and the endorsement test capture is the way 
in which religious majorities use the governmental sector—be it the lawmaking process or the 
expressive power of government speech—to foster doctrinal religious arguments, which, I 
contend, have no proper place in the governmental sector precisely because non-adherents to 
the dominant faith cannot participate equally and fully. See supra note 4. 
 173. But see Koppelman, supra note 3, at 89, 116 n.100 (focusing on a plausible secular 
purpose), 118; Shiffrin, supra note 9, at 40, 42; sources cited in Greene, Political Balance, 
supra note 4, at 1620 n.32. 
 174. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968). 
 175. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987). 
 176. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 177. McCreary County v. ACLU, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005). 
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religious argument in the lawmaking process and on religious 
proselytization in our public schools and in government speech.178 
Smith, therefore, is a mistake. Its focus on generality—upholding 
laws of general applicability that only incidentally burden religion—
is not a proper parallel to upholding laws of general applicability that 
only incidentally benefit religion. Rather, because we have limited 
the effect of religion on government, we need a doctrine that 
compensates by limiting the effect of government on religion. 
Elsewhere, I have detailed some objections and responses to this 
proposal179—the principal one being that our Establishment Clause 
limitation on religious inputs mostly harms adherents to dominant 
religions, while it is the adherents to minority religions who are most 
in need of exemptions from generally applicable laws, and therefore 
that the compensation is mismatched. This argument misses two key 
points—first, that our Establishment Clause doctrine prevents even 
adherents to minority religions from seeking to use the government to 
advance their doctrinal ideas, perhaps through coalitions with larger 
groups or perhaps as to items that escape broader majoritarian 
attention; and second, that even members of dominant religions might 
be burdened by the failure of generally applicable laws to create 
accommodations for aspects of religious practice. 
The doctrine regarding the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment under the Rehnquist Court has a superficial consistency. 
At the same time, the development of Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement test, primarily in opinions by her and by Justice Souter, 
has revealed that the focus on whether the government benefits or 
burdens religion as part of a larger class or, rather, in a targeted 
fashion, does not properly grasp the way in which the doctrine treats 
religion as distinctive, at least for Establishment Clause purposes. We 
need a more robust commitment to judicially created exemptions 
under the Free Exercise Clause (in tandem with legislatively crafted 
accommodations) to offset the ways in which religious citizens are 
 
 178. See supra note 5. For other arguments supporting free exercise exemptions as of right, 
see McConnell, supra note 10; David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free 
Exercise Exemption: A Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241 (1995). But see Eisgruber & 
Sager, supra note 117, at 449; Gedicks, supra note 44, at 1073 n.7; William P. Marshall, In 
Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991). 
 179. See Greene, supra note 1, at 236; Greene, Political Balance, supra note 4, at 1636–39. 
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asked to abstain from a full and express use of government to 
advance their theological ends. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
